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1 Introduction
In private value second-price auctions each bidder has a dominant strategy in
which he bids his own valuation of the object. However, in second-price auctions
with interdependent values bidders may not have dominant strategies while there
may exist multiple equilibria in undominated strategies. For example Birulin
(2003) [12] shows that any auction with an efficient ex-post equilibrium has a
continuum of inefficient undominated ex-post equilibria. Therefore, a selection
tool is needed in such Bayesian games to rule out the less intuitive equilibria.
We develop a concept of trembling hand perfect equilibrium for Bayesian games
with infinite type and action spaces, called distributional strictly perfect equilib-
rium (DSPE). In this equilibrium concept, players’ strategies are robust against
any slight perturbations of their opponents’ strategies.
In finite normal form games, DSPE is equivalent to strictly perfect equilibrium
by Okada (1981) [29], 1 as both definitions require robustness against arbitrary
slight perturbations of strategies. It is known that strictly perfect equilibrium
may not exist (see example 1.5.5 in van Damme [33]), therefore DSPE may not
exist even in finite games. However, we can prove existence of a weaker notion
of DSPE, which is called distributional perfect equilibrium, in Bayesian games
for which the type space of each player is a separable metric space, the action
space of each player is a compact metric space, and player types are drawn from
a prior probability measure on the product of the type spaces that is absolutely
continuous with respect to the product measure of its marginal probabilities. 2 3
We apply this notion of perfection to second price auctions with interdependent
values in order to select among equilibria. In our auction model, there is one con-
tinuous and efficient equilibrium introduced by Milgrom (1981) [27] and a set of
inefficient ex-post equilibria introduced by Birulin [12]. All of these equilibria
are undominated and there is no dominant strategy. We prove that the only effi-
cient equilibrium is DSPE and the rest are not. In other words, our results show
1The proof is available upon request.
2This property is called absolute continuity of information in Milgrom and Weber [28].
3For further studies on the existence of equilibrium in Bayesian games, we refer to Athey [3],
Mcadams [23], Reny [31], Jackson et al. [17],[18], Mertens [26], Meirowitz [24], Milgrom and
Weber [28], Mallozzi et al. [25], Kim and Yannelis [19], Zandt and Vives [35], and Balder [7].
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that the efficient and continuous equilibrium is robust against arbitrary slight per-
turbation of strategies, while other discontinuous and inefficient equilibria are
not. These discontinuous equilibria contain either overbidding or underbidding
when compared with the efficient strategy profile by Milgrom [27]. We show
that if each bidder believes that with a very small probability her opponent can
bid according to the efficient bidding strategy, then overbidding or underbidding
is not a best response.
Bajoori et al. (2016) [6], define the notion of Perfect BNE and apply this notion
to an example in interdependent value auctions. In a Perfect BNE the strate-
gies are robust against some slight perturbations of strategies. This definition is
weaker than the notion of DSPE, but it is not strong enough to exclude all the
discontinuous and inefficient equilibria in a more general model of an interde-
pendent value auction.
To the best of our knowledge there is not much research done on the theory of
equilibrium selection in interdependent value auctions. However, there are some
relatively recent studies on the equilibrium selection in common value auctions
such as Parreiras (2006) [30], Abraham et al. (2012) [2], Cheng and Tan (2008)
[13], Larson (2009) [21], and Liu (2014) [22]. In the most relevant study by
Liu [22], they use noisy bids rather than strategy perturbations. In their model,
bidders need to believe that any bid is possible for their opponent even if this
strategy does not have full support. They show that the equilibria introduced by
Moilgrom [27] are robust against such noisy bids, while the Birulin [12] equi-
libria are note. Our selection tool is a refinement of Bayesian Nash equilibrium
that uses strategy perturbations and is successful in excluding discontinuous and
inefficient equilibria in interdependent value auctions.
To illustrate our results, we discuss the following example.
Example 1.1 Consider a 2-bidder second-price auction with interdependent val-
ues v1 = t1 + 12t2 and v2 =
1
2
t1 + t2. Types t1, t2 for bidder 1 and 2 are drawn
independently from [0, 1] according to the uniform distribution. Each bidder si-
multaneously submits a bid from the set [0, 3
2
]. The efficient BNE introduced
by Milgrom [27] is the strategy pair (b1, b2) in which bi = 32ti for every bidder
i = 1, 2. We can show that this BNE is robust against any slight perturbations
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of the strategies (Proposition 4.2). On the other hand, the class of inefficient ex
post equilibria introduced by Birulin [12] are as follows. For fixed s1, s2 ∈ [0, 1]
with s1 < s2, define
bˆ1(t1) =
{
s2 +
1
2
t1 if t1 ∈ [s1, s2]
3
2
t1 otherwise,
bˆ2(t2) =
{
s1 +
1
2
t2 if t2 ∈ [s1, s2]
3
2
t2 otherwise.
An example of such an equilibrium is depicted in Figure 1. In each such an
equilibrium, when the realizations of both types are within the set [s1, s2], bidder
1 wins the auction and pays the amount bˆ2(t2) = s1 + 12t2, which is his minimum
ex post valuation. Thus, in this case bidder 1 overbids, while bidder 2 underbids.
So, since such equilibria lead to inefficient outcomes, we would like to be able to
rule them out. Proposition 4.4 shows that the equilibria (bˆ1, bˆ2) are not DSPEs.
Intuitively, to exclude such equilibria it is enough to make the bidders believe
that with a tiny probability their opponents bid according to the efficient bidding
strategy. Then, the overbidding (underbidding) is not a best response against
underbidding (overbidding).
t1
bˆ1
s2 +
1
2
t1
s1 s2
t2
bˆ2
s1 +
1
2
t2
s1 s2
Figure 1
The paper is structured as follows. First, we provide some preliminary notions
in Section 2. In section 3 we introduce the concept of distributional strictly
perfection. In section 4, first we present our interdependent value auction model.
Then, we have two subsections; one on selected equilibrium and the other on
discarding equilibria.
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2 Preliminaries
A Bayesian game Γ is defined as follows. There are n players. For each player i,
the set Ti of types is a complete separable metric space, and the set Ai of actions
is a compact metric space. Let dTi and dAi denote the respective metrics, and let
Ti andAi denote the induced Borel σ-fields on Ti andAi respectively. Moreover,
let T = ×ni=1Ti and A = ×ni=1Ai.
Let µ be a probability measure on the product σ-field T = ⊗ni=1Ti with marginal
probability µi on Ti for every player i. We assume that each µi is a completely
mixed probability measure. 4
Player i’s payoff function pii : T ×A→ IR is assumed to be bounded and jointly
measurable.
We define two classes of strategies: behavioral strategies and distributional strate-
gies. We also define Bayesian Nash Equilibrium (BNE).
A pure strategy for player i in Γ is a measurable function pi : Ti → Ai. A
behavioral strategy for player i is a function βi : Ti ×Ai → [0, 1] such that
[1] the section function βi(ti, ·) : Ai → [0, 1] is a probability measure for
every ti ∈ Ti, and
[2] the section function βi(·, B) : Ti → [0, 1] is measurable for every B ∈ Ai.
When player i plays according to the behavioral strategy βi, for each type ti ∈ Ti,
he chooses his action according to the probability measure βi(ti, ·).
A behavioral strategy βi for player i is called pure if there is a pure strategy pi for
player i such that βi(ti, ·) = Dpi(ti)(·) for every type ti ∈ Ti, where D denotes
Dirac measure. For simplicity, we denote this pure behavioral strategy by pi.
Following Milgrom and Weber [28], a distributional strategy for player i in a
Bayesian game is a probability measure γi on Ti × Ai such that the marginal
distribution of γi on Ti equals the probability measure µi. That is, γi(U ×Ai) =
µi(U) for everyU ∈ Ti. Given a behavioral strategy βi, the induced distributional
4A probability measure is completely mixed if it assigns strictly positive weight to every
nonempty open set.
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strategy γi is uniquely determined by
γi(U ×B) =
∫
U
βi(ti, B) µi(dti)
for every rectangle U × B ∈ Ti ⊗ Ai. This induces a many-to-one mapping
from behavioral strategies to distributional strategies that preserves the players’
ex ante expected payoffs.
The vector β = (β1, β2, . . . , βn), where βi is player i’s behavioral strategy, is
called a behavioral strategy profile. For every player i we write β−i = (βj)ni 6=j=1
to denote the behavioral strategy profile for his opponents. The definitions are
similar for distributional strategies.
Let ∆i be the set of all distributional strategies for player i and ∆ = ×ni=1∆i. Let
Πi : ∆→ IR be the expected payoff of player i playing distributional strategy γi
against a distributional strategy profile γ−i. So,
Πi(γi, γ−i) =
∫
pii(t, a) γi(dai | ti)γ−i(da−i | t−i) µ(dt),
where t = (t1, . . . , tn) ∈ T , a = (a1, . . . , an) ∈ A, and γi(dai | ti) is a version
of conditional probability on Ai given ti. By integrals with respect to γ−i(da−i |
t−i) we mean the iterated integrals with respect to γj(daj | tj) for all j 6= i.
As the measure µ is absolutely continuous with respect to µˆ, by the Radon-
Nikodym theorem there is a measurable function f : T → IR such that for every
measurable set G ∈ T we have µ(G) =
∫
G
fdµˆ. Therefore, the expected payoff
Πi can be expressed in an easier form as
Πi(γi, γ−i) =
∫
pii(t, a)f(t) dγidγ−i.
Let βi be a behavioral strategy corresponding to the distributional strategy γi, for
every player i. Then, by Theorem 10.2.1 in Dudley [14] 5 we conclude that
Πi(γi, γ−i) =
∫
pii(t, a)f(t) βi(ti, dai) µi(dti) β−i(t−i, da−i) µ−i(dt−i).
5Dudley’s notation and terminology in [14] differs from ours. Part (II) of Theorem 10.2.1. in
Dudley [14] with our terminology can be expressed as follows: For every measurable function
g : Ti ×Ai → IR we have∫
Ti×Ai
g dγi =
∫
Ti
∫
Ai
g βi(ti, dai) µi(dti).
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By Πbi(βi, β−i | ti) we denote player i’s expected payoff given his behavioral
strategy βi and his type ti against a behavioral strategy profile β−i. Thus,
Πbi(βi, β−i | ti) =
∫
pii(t, a)f(t) βi(ti, dai) β−i(t−i, da−i) µ−i(dt−i).
Furthermore, notice that
Πi(γ1, . . . , γn) =
∫
Πbi(βi, β−i | ti) µi(dti).
In the special case where player i chooses a pure behavioral strategy pi, his ex-
pected payoff is
Πbi(pi, β−i | ti) =
∫
pii (t, (pi(ti), a−i)) f(t) β−i(t−i, da−i) µ−i(dt−i).
One can also define Πbi(σi, β−i | ti) and Πbi(ai, β−i | ti) respectively for every
probability measure σi on Ai and every action ai ∈ Ai.
A probability measure σi on Ai is called a best response of player i for type
ti ∈ Ti against a behavioral strategy profile τ−i, if for every probability measure
σ′i on Ai we have
Πbi(σi, τ−i | ti) ≥ Πbi(σ′i, τ−i | ti).
The set of such best responses is denoted by BRi(ti, τ). A behavioral strategy
βi is called a best response of player i against the behavioral strategy profile
τ−i, if βi(ti, ·) ∈ BRi(ti, τ) for every ti ∈ Ti. A behavioral strategy profile
β = (β1, . . . , βn) is a Bayesian Nash Equilibrium (BNE) if βi is a best response
to β−i for every player i.
A distributional strategy γi of player i is a best response against a distributional
strategy profile η−i, if Πi(γi, η−i) ≥ Πi(γ˜i, η−i), for every distributional strategy
γ˜i of player i. Let BRi : ∆  ∆i denote the best response correspondence for
player i on the set of distributional strategies. Moreover, define BR : ∆  ∆,
for every γ ∈ ∆, as BR(γ) = ×ni=1BRi(γ).
We say that a behavioral strategy βi (weakly) dominates behavioral strategy βˆi
if, for their respective induced distributional strategies γi and γˆi, it holds that
Πi(γi, γ−i) ≥ Πi(γˆi, γ−i)
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for all γ−i ∈ ∆−i, and with a strict inequality for at least one γ−i ∈ ∆−i. A
behavioral strategy βi is called (weakly) dominant if it dominates every other
behavioral strategy of player i. A behavioral strategy βi is undominated if there
is no other behavioral strategy that dominates βi.
3 Distributional strictly perfect equilibrium
In this section, we define perfect equilibrium for Bayesian games in terms of
behavioral strategies. Since only the induced distribution on opponents’ actions
matter for computation of expected payoffs, we use distributional strategies as a
tool to verify whether the behavioral strategy profile satisfies the conditions of
trembling hand perfect equilibrium.
Let Cb(Ti × Ai) be the set of all continuous and bounded functions with domain
Ti × Ai. The weak topology on ∆i is the coarsest topology for which all the
maps γi →
∫
h dγi, h ∈ Cb(Ti×Ai) are continuous. Since Ti×Ai is a separable
metric space, the weak topology on ∆i is separable and metrizable with the weak
(Prohorov) metric 6, denoted by ρw.
Definition 3.1 A behavioral strategy profile β = (β1, . . . , βn) is called distri-
butional strictly perfect equilibrium (DSPE) if, given the induced profile γ =
(γ1, . . . , γn) of distributional strategies, for every completely mixed strategy pro-
file ν = (ν1, . . . , νn) and every sequence (εki )
∞
k=1 of real numbers converging to
zero, the sequence (γki )
∞
k=1 defined by γ
k
i = (1 − εik) · γi + εki · νi for every i is
such that
lim
k→∞
ρw(γki , BRi(γ
k)) = 0,
in which γk = (γk1 , . . . , γ
k
n).
A behavioral strategy profile is a distributional strictly perfect BNE if it is both
distributionally strictly perfect and a BNE.
The above equilibrium concept may not exist even in finite games. DSPE is
equivalent to strictly perfect equilibrium in finite normal form games 7 and we
6See Aliprantis and Border [1]. Let µ and ν be two probability measures on a σ-field Σ.
Weak (Prohorov) metric is defined for µ and ν by ρw(µ, ν) = inf{ε > 0 | ∀B ∈ Σ : µ(B) <
ν(Bε) + ε and ν(B) < µ(Bε) + ε}.
7The proof is available upon request
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see that in example 1.5.5 in van Damme [33] there is no strictly perfect equi-
librium. However, we can define a weaker version of DSPE that is called dis-
tributional perfect equilibrium and prove that for every Bayesian game, the set
of distributional BNEs is not empty under two additional assumptions: First, the
measure µ to be absolutely continuous 8 with respect to µˆ = ×ni=1µi. 9 Second,
payoffs to be continuous in actions for every type, that is, pii(t, ·) : A → IR is
continuous for every t ∈ T .
A behavioral strategy profile β = (β1, . . . , βn) is called distributional perfect
if for the induced distributional strategy profile γ = (γ1, . . . , γn) there exists a
sequence (γk)∞k=1 = (γ
k
1 , . . . , γ
k
n)
∞
k=1 of completely mixed distributional strategy
profiles such that for every player i it holds that
(i) lim
k→∞
ρw(γki , γi) = 0,
(ii) lim
k→∞
ρw(γki , BRi(γ
k)) = 0.
A behavioral strategy profile is a distributional perfect BNE if it is both distribu-
tional perfect and a BNE.
We can show that the set of distributional perfect BNEs is nonempty. The proof
can be found in the appendix and it is based on the existence proof in Simon and
Stinchcombe [?] and Milgrom and Weber [28].
4 Interdependent value auctions
In this section we study symmetric second-price auctions with interdependent
values for two bidders and apply strict distributional perfection in this context.
Let Λ be the following sealed-bid second-price auction for a single indivisible
object. There are 2 bidders. Prior to bidding, each bidder i receives a private
signal ti ∈ Ti = [t, t], which is called the type of bidder i. Signals are drawn
independently according to a distribution µi. Bidder i’s valuation of the object
8Let µ and ν be two measures on a σ-field Σ. The measure µ is absolutely continuous with
respect to ν if for every G ∈ Σ, ν(G) = 0 implies µ(G) = 0.
9In Milgrom and Weber [28] this property is called Absolutely Continuous Information. Ab-
solutely continuous information is a rather weak assumption. It is satisfied when the type spaces
are finite, or when each player’s type is drawn independently from his type space.
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may depend on both types and is denoted by vi(t1, t2). Each bidder i, after ob-
serving his own type, submits a bid from a set Ai independently of his opponent,
where Ai is sufficiently large in the sense that it contains the range of vi. Given
the bids submitted by the bidders, the highest bid wins the auction for the price
equal to the second highest bid. 10 Suppose the following assumptions in this
auction:
[1] v1(t1, t2) = v2(t2, t1).
[2] vi is continuously differentiable.
[3] ∂vi
∂ti
(t1, t2) >
∂vi
∂tj
(t′1, t
′
2) ≥ 0 for all t1, t2, t′1, t′2.
Condition [3], without the non-negativity requirement, is a strong form of the
single crossing condition (SCC). It is for example satisfied by linear valuation
functions v1(t1, t2) = a · t1 + b · t2 for non-negative numbers a, b with a > b.
Condition [3] has several important consequences, of which we mention three.
First, it implies that vi is strictly increasing in ti and increasing in tj for j 6= i.
Second, in combination with condition [1] it ensures that the bidder with the
higher type has the higher ex post valuation. 11 Third, the pair of strategies
(b1, b2) in which bi = vi(ti, ti) for every bidder i, is an efficient equilibrium. 12
More information on SCC can be found in for example Krishna [20].
In the auction Λ the set of available bids for bidder i is an interval Ai = [a, a],
where vi(t, t) = a and vi(t, t) = a, for i = 1, 2. In this auction bidders do not
have any dominant strategy (disregarding the classic case of private values for a
moment), and there are many equilibria.
In the next two subsections we show how DSPE can be used to refine among
these equilibria. We show that the efficient equilibrium introduced in Milgrom
[27] is a DSPE. In contrast with this, we show that within the class of inefficient
equilibria introduced in Birulin [12] none of them are DSPE.
10In the event of a tie for the highest bid, the winner is chosen according to a probability
distribution which may depend on the identity of the highest bidder and his type as well. In our
setting, a tie will only occur with probability 0, even given the type of one bidder, which makes
the specification of this tie-breaking rule irrelevant for the expected profits.
11Thus, common value auctions do not satisfy SSC.
12An outcome in the auction is called efficient if the winner is the one with the highest ex post
valuation.
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4.1 Equilibrium refinement I: equilibrium selection
Milgrom [27] introduced the following class of strategy pairs. Let φ : [t, t] →
[t, t] be an increasing bijection. Define the strategy pair (b1, b2) by b1(t1) =
v1(t1, φ(t1)) and b2(t2) = v2(φ−1(t2), t2). In Proposition 4.1 we show that within
this class of continuous strategy pairs only one focal strategy pair is a BNE. In
Proposition 4.2 we show that this focal BNE is a DSPE. We also argue that the
BNE is not in dominant strategies (unless we are considering the special case
of pure private values). Thus, dominance cannot be used as a means to refine
among equilibria in this context.
Proposition 4.1 Let (b1, b2) be the strategy pair defined above. Then, (b1, b2) is
a BNE if and only if φ(t) = t.
Proof. A. Suppose that φ(t) = t for every t ∈ [t, t]. We show that (b1, b2)
is a BNE. Define w(t) = v1(t, t) for every t ∈ [t, t]. Clearly w is an increasing
bijection from [t, t] to [a, a]. Suppose that bidder 1 uses bid function b1(t1) =
v1(t1, t1). The expected payoff of bidder 2 having type t2 and bidding p2 is:
Πb2(b1, p2 | t2) =
∫ w−1(p2)
t
(v2(t1, t2)− v1(t1, t1)) µ1(dt1).
As v2 is strictly increasing in the second argument, and moreover
v2(t1, t2)− v1(t1, t1) = v2(t1, t2)− v2(t1, t1),
it is clear that v2(t1, t2)−v1(t1, t1) ≥ 0 precisely when t1 ≤ t2. So, the maximum
of Πbi(b1, p2 | t2) is obtained by choosing p2 such that w−1(p2) = t2. Hence, the
optimal bidding strategy is
b2(t2) = w(t2) = v1(t2, t2) = v2(t2, t2).
B. Conversely, suppose that φ(t) 6= t for some t ∈ [t, t]. We show that (b1, b2)
is not a BNE.
If φ(t) > t. Then
v2(t, φ(t)) > v2(φ(t), t)
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by assumption [3] in our auction model. So, v2(t, φ(t)) 6= v2(φ(t), t). A similar
argument applies for the case φ(t) < t.
Thus, there is a type tˆ2 with v2(tˆ2, φ(tˆ2)) 6= v2(φ(tˆ2), tˆ2). Write t∗2 = φ(tˆ2).
We first argue that t∗2 6= φ−1(t∗2). Suppose that t∗2 = φ−1(t∗2). Then φ(t∗2) =
t∗2 = φ(tˆ2), so that tˆ2 = t
∗
2 = φ(tˆ2). Then v2(tˆ2, φ(tˆ2)) = v2(φ(tˆ2), tˆ2). This
contradicts our assumption.
Now suppose that bidder 1 uses bid function b1(t1) = v1(t1, φ(t1)). The expected
payoff of bidder 2 having type t∗2 and bidding p2 is:
Πb2(b1, p2 | t∗2) =
∫ w−1(p2)
t
(v2(t1, t
∗
2)− v1(t1, φ(t1))) µ1(dt1).
Define f(t1) = v2(t1, t∗2)− v1(t1, φ(t1)). Since
f(t1) = v2(t1, t
∗
2)− v1(t1, φ(t1)) = v2(t1, t∗2)− v2(φ(t1), t1)
it follows that
f ′(t1) =
∂v2
∂t1
− ∂v2
∂t1
· φ′(t1)− ∂v2
∂t2
=
∂v2
∂t1
− ∂v2
∂t2
− ∂v2
∂t1
· φ′(t1).
So, by assumption [3], f is strictly decreasing. Further,
f(φ−1(t∗2)) = v2(φ
−1(t∗2), t
∗
2)− v2(φ(φ−1(t∗2)), φ−1(t∗2))
= v2(φ
−1(t∗2), t
∗
2)− v2(t∗2, φ−1(t∗2))
Now recall that t∗2 6= φ−1(t∗2). If t∗2 > φ−1(t∗2). Then f(φ−1(t∗2)) > 0. As
the function f is strictly decreasing, we can conclude that Πb2(b1, p2 | t∗2) is
maximized at a type t˜1 > φ−1(t∗2). If t
∗
2 < φ
−1(t∗2), then Π
b
2(b1, p2 | t∗2) is
maximized at a type t˜1 < φ−1(t∗2). In both cases, b2(t
∗
2) 6= v2(φ−1(t∗2), t∗2).
Thus, this class of strategy pairs contains only one BNE, namely the pair for
which bi = vi(ti, ti) for every i = 1, 2. We show that the BNE is also distribu-
tionally perfect.
Proposition 4.2 The strategy pair (b1, b2), where bi = vi(ti, ti) for i = 1, 2 is a
DSPE. Further, bi is undominated for every bidder i.
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Proof. We prove that the BNE (b1, b2) is a DSPE. Let γi be the distributional
strategy induced by bi. For every k ∈ IN define γk1 = (1− εk) ·γ1 + εk ·ν1, where
εk ∈ (0, 1), εk → 0 as k → ∞, and ν1 is any completely mixed distributional
strategy on the product space T1 × A1. 13
It suffices to show that for each k there is a strategy ηk2 ∈ BR2(γk1 ) such that
lim
k→∞
ρw(γ2, η
k
2) = 0.
The proof is in two steps. Let t2 be a type of bidder 2.
A. We show that p2 = b2 is the unique maximizer of F (p2) = Πb2(b1, p2 | t2)
and F (p2) is continuous. Recall that
F (p2) = Π
b
2(b1, p2 | t2) =
∫ w−1(p2)
t
(v2(t1, t2)− v1(t1, t1)) µ1(dt1),
where w denotes the strictly increasing function w(t) = v1(t, t). Since the inte-
grand
v2(t1, t2)− v1(t1, t1) = v2(t1, t2)− v2(t1, t1)
is continuous and strictly decreasing in t1, and w−1(p2) is continuous and strictly
increasing in p2, it is clear that F (p2) is continuous. Further, since the integrand
is zero at t1 = t2, it is also clear that F (p2) has a unique maximum location at
value p2 with w−1(p2) = t2. Thus,
p2 = w(t2) = v1(t2, t2) = v2(t2, t2) = b2(t2)
is the unique maximizer of F (p2).
B. We prove that for each k there is a strategy ηk2 ∈ BR2(γk1 ) such that
lim
k→∞
ρw(γ2, η
k
2) = 0.
Let p2 be a pure behavioral strategy for bidder 2 and σ2 be the distributional
strategy induced by p2. Then, the expected payoff of bidder 2 choosing σ2 against
13That is, η1 is a completely mixed measure on T1×A1 and η1(S1×A1) = µ1(S1) for every
S1 ∈ T1.
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γk1 is:
Π2(γ
k
1 , σ2) =
∫ ∫
p2>a1
(v2(t1, t2)− a1) dγk1dσ2
=
∫
T2
∫
p2>a1
(v2(t1, t2)− a1) dγk1µ2(dt2)
=
∫
T2
Πb2(β
k
1 , p2 | t2) µ2(dt2),
where βk1 is a behavioral strategy corresponding to γ
k
1 for every k ∈ IN. Let bk2
be any maximizer of Πb2(β
k
1 , p2 | t2) for every k, where
Πb2(β
k
1 , p2 | t2) = (1− εk)
∫
p2>a1
(v2(t1, t2)− a1) dγ1
+ εk
∫
p2>a1
(v2(t1, t2)− a1) dη1
= (1− εk)
∫ w−1(p2)
t
(v2(t1, t2)− v1 (t1, φ(t1))) µ1(dt1)
+ εk
∫
p2>a1
(v2(t1, t2)− a1) dη1
= (1− εk) Πb2(b1, p2 | t2) + εk
∫
p2>a1
(v2(t1, t2)− a1) dη1.
Note that the maximizer bk2 exists, because Π
b
2(β
k
1 , p2 | t2) is a continuous func-
tion over the compact set T2. We know that p2 = b2 is the unique maximizer
of Πb2(b1, p2 | t2). Thus, according to Lemma 6.1, we have that bk2 converges to
b2 when k → ∞. Now, let ηk2 be the induced distributional strategy by bk2. As
bk2 ∈ BR2(t2, βk1 ), then we have ηk2 ∈ BR2(γk1 ). Furthermore, since bk2(t2) con-
verges to b2(t2) for every t2 ∈ T2, we conclude ρw(γ2, ηk2) −→ 0 when k →∞.
With a similar argument for bidder 2, we can conclude that (b1, b2) is a DSPE.
Finally, as bidding b2 is the unique best response for bidder 2 against b1, we
conclude that b2 is undominated. A similar argument holds for b1.
In the next proposition we prove that this strategy pair is not in dominant strate-
gies, unless we are in the pure private values case.
Proposition 4.3 Suppose that the valuation function vi is not private values.
Then the strategy bi = vi(ti, ti) is not dominant.
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Proof. Assume that v1 is not private values. We prove that b1 = v1(t1, t1) is
not a dominant strategy. In particular, we construct a bid function d2 for bidder
2 and an open set I1 of types for bidder 1, such that there is a bid a ∈ A1 for
bidder 1 that yields a strictly higher payoff against d2 than b1(t1) = v1(t1, t1) for
any type t1 ∈ I1, . This then is a sufficient argument.
Since v1 is not private values, by condition [3] there is an s1 in T1 and an open
set B2 in T2 such that the map v1(s1, ·) : T2 → A2 is strictly increasing on B2.
Suppose that B2 ∩ [t, s1) is not empty. Then we may assume that t2 < s1 for all
t2 ∈ B2. Then, for every t2 ∈ B2 we have v1(s1, t2) < v1(s1, s1). Define
y(t1) =
∫ t1
t
v1(t1, t2) µ2(dt2).
Since v1(s1, t2) ≤ v1(s1, s1) for every t2 < s1, and v1(s1, t2) < v1(s1, s1) for
every t2 ∈ B2, it follows that
y(s1) =
∫ s1
t
v1(s1, t2) µ2(dt2) < v1(s1, s1) = b1(s1).
So, y(s1) < b1(s1). Since t < s1 and b1 is strictly increasing and continuous,
there is u1 < s1 with b1(u1) > y(s1).
Take I1 = (u1, s1). Then, since y and b1 are strictly increasing functions, for
every t1 ∈ I1 we have y(t1) < y(s1) < b1(u1) < b1(t1).
Take the (constant) bid function d2(t2) = b1(u1) for every t2 ∈ T2 for bidder
2. Take t1 ∈ I1 and any t2 ∈ T2. Since bidder 1 bids according to b1(t1), and
d2(t2) = b1(u1) < b1(t1), bidder 1 wins the auction. Consequently, his expected
payoff against d2 is∫
T2
(v1(t1, t2)− b1(u1)) µ2(dt2) = y(t1)− b1(u1) < 0.
A similar argument applies to the case where B2 ∩ (s1, t] is not empty. This
concludes the proof.
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4.2 Equilibrium refinement II: discarding equilibria
Birulin in [12] on page 678 introduces the following class of discontinuous asym-
metric strategy profiles. 14 For given s1, s2 ∈ [t, t] with s1 < s2, define the
strategy pair (bˆ1, bˆ2) by
bˆ1(t1) =
{
v1(s2, t1) if t1 ∈ [s1, s2]
v1(t1, t1) otherwise,
bˆ2(t2) =
{
v2(t2, s1) if t2 ∈ [s1, s2]
v2(t2, t2) otherwise.
Birulin [12] shows that, under SCC, the strategy pair (bˆ1, bˆ2) is an ex post equi-
librium that allocates the object inefficiently. Moreover, this equilibrium may be
in undominated strategies. In the equilibrium above, bidder 1 overbids and bid-
der 2 underbids for types between s1 and s2. In the proposition below we prove
that strict distributional perfection rules out these equilibria. 15 The intuition be-
hind this result is that if there is a small chance that one bidder bids bi = vi(ti, ti)
for ti ∈ [s1, s2] instead of bˆi, then bˆj will no longer be a best response for bid-
der j, where j 6= i. In other words, underbidding (overbidding) would not be a
best response against overbidding (underbidding) if even with a tiny probability
one bidder bids according to the efficient bidding strategy bi = vi(ti, ti). As an
extreme case, we see that the ex post equilibrium 16 in which one bidder always
bids a and the other bidder always bids a is not a DSPE.
Proposition 4.4 The equilibrium (bˆ1, bˆ2) is not a DSPE.
Proof. A. First we show that if bidder 1 bids according to a behaviorial com-
pletely mixed strategy that converges to bˆ1, then bidding bˆ2 for bidder 2 is not
optimal on a set of types with strictly positive measure. Assume bidder 1 bids
according to βk1 strategy:
βk1 (t1) = (1− 2δk)bˆ1(t1) + δkb1(t1) + δkη1(t1),
14Our presentation of the bid functions is slightly different from Birulin [12]. He presents the
bid functions in terms of the opponents’ valuations. We do this for each bidder in terms of his
own valuations.
15In finite games, an equilibrium is perfect if and only if it is in undominated strategies. This
is in general not true in games with infinite action spaces, even if undominatedness is replaced
by limit undominatedness. Bajoori et. al in [5] give a detailed analysis on this issue. They prove
that, in normal form games under appropriate assumptions, every weak perfect equilibrium is in
limit undominated strategies, but not vice versa. Example 6 in Bajoori et. al [5] provides the
relevant counter-example.
16This kind of equilibrium is often called a wolf and sheep equilibrium.
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where b1(t1) = v1(t1, t1), η1 is any completely mixed strategy for bidder 1, and
δk → 0 when k → ∞. Clearly, βk1 converges to bˆ1 when k → ∞ pointwisely.
We show that bidding b˜2(t2) = v2(s1, s2) is strictly better than bidding bˆ2 for
t2 ∈ (s1, s2) for bidder 2. Note that bˆ2 = v2(t2, s1) for t2 ∈ (s1, s2). Define
w(t) = v1(t, t). Bidder 2’s expected payoff by bidding bˆ2 = v2(t2, s1) against
βk1 for every t2 ∈ (s1, s2) is
Πb2(β
k
1 , bˆ2 | t2) = (1− 2δk)
∫ s1
t
(v2 − v1(t1, t1)) dµ(t1)
+ δk
∫ w−1(bˆ2)
t
(v2 − v1(t1, t1)) dµ(t1)
+ δk
∫
bˆ2>a1
(v2 − a1) dη1(t1).
Moreover, bidder 2’s expected payoff by bidding b˜2 = v2(s1, s2) against βk1 for
every t2 ∈ (s1, s2) is
Πb2(β
k
1 , b˜2 | t2) = (1− 2δk)
∫ s1
t
(v2 − v1(t1, t1)) dµ(t1)
+ δk
∫ w−1(b˜2)
t
(v2 − v1(t1, t1)) dµ(t1)
+ δk
∫
b˜2>a1
(v2 − a1) dη1(t1).
By condition [3] in our auction model, we have bˆ2(t2) = v2(t2, s1) < v2(s1, s2) =
b˜2(t2). Because the function w is a strictly increasing bijection, we can have
w−1(bˆ2) < w−1(b˜2). Hence, Πb2(β
k
1 , bˆ2 | t2) < Πb2(βk1 , b˜2 | t2). Therefore,
bˆ2(t2) /∈ BR2(t2, βk1 ) for t2 ∈ (s1, s2) and every k.
B. To show that (bˆ1, bˆ2) is not a DSPE, we show that for the induced distribu-
tional strategy profile (γˆ1, γˆ2)
∃ν = (ν1, ν2) and ∃(εk)∞k=1 = (ε1k, ε2k)∞k=1
in which ν1, ν2 are completely mixed distributional strategies and ε1k, ε
2
k → 0
when k →∞ such that for γk1 = (1− ε1k)γˆ1 + ε1kν1 and γk2 = (1− ε2k)γˆ2 + ε2kν2
we have
ρw(γk2 , BR2(γ
k
1 )) > ε.
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for an ε > 0. Let ε2k = 0 for every k, then we have γ
k
2 = γˆ2 for every k.
Therefore, it is enough to prove that
ρw(γˆ2, BR2(γ
k
1 )) > ε.
for an ε > 0.
Let β˜k2 be such that β˜
k
2 (t2, ·) ∈ BR2(t2, βk1 ) for every t2 ∈ T2 and every k. In
part A we show that bˆ2(t2) /∈ BR2(t2, βk1 ) for t2 ∈ (s1, s2). As the function
Πb2(β
k
1 , p2 | t2) is continuous in p2, then any point in a neighborhood of bˆ2(t2) is
not a best response against βk1 either. Therefore, there are ε > 0 and λ > 0 such
that if for every t2 ∈ (s1, s2) we define
Bt2 =
(
bˆ2(t2)− λ, bˆ2(t2) + λ
)
,
then we have
1. s1 + ε < s2 − ε,
2. µ2(s1 + ε, s2 − ε) > ε,
3. β˜k2 (t2, (Bt2)
ε) = 0.
Now, let B = {(t2, a2) | t2 ∈ (s1 + ε, s2 − ε), a2 ∈ Bt2}. Clearly, B is mea-
surable. Also, let γ˜k2 and γ
k
1 be the distributional strategies induced by β˜
k
2 , and
βk1 respectively. One can write
γk1 = (1− ε1k)γˆ1 + ε1kν1
in which ε1k = 2δk and ν1 is the completely mixed distributional strategy induced
by behaviorial strategies b1 and η1. Moreover, we have γ˜k2 ∈ BR2(γk1 ). As
bˆ2(t2)(Bt2) = 1
17 and β˜k2 (t2, (Bt2)
ε) = 0, we have
γˆ2(B) =
∫ s2−ε
s1+ε
bˆ2(t2)(Bt2)µ2(dt2) = µ2(s1 + ε, s2 − ε)
and
γ˜k2 (B
ε) =
∫ s2
s1
β˜k2 (t2, (Bt2)
ε)µ2(dt2) = 0.
17Notice that bˆ2(t2) is interpreted as a behavioral strategy that assigns probability 1 on bˆ2(t2)
for every t2 ∈ T2.
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Consequently,
γˆ2(B) > γ˜
k
2 (B
ε) + ε,
then ρw(γˆ2, γ˜k2 ) > ε for every k. Hence, we have ρ
w(γˆ2, BR2(γ
k
1 )) > ε for every
k. The proof is complete.
5 Conclusion
We introduce the concept of distributional strictly perfect equilibrium (DSPE) as
a refinement of Bayesian Nash equilibrium. We apply this concept in symmetric
second-price auctions with interdependent values for two bidders to select the
efficient BNE, and to rule out the less intuitive equilibria. In particular, we show
that the efficient BNE discussed in Milgrom [27] is a DSPE. We also show that
DSPE rules out all the discontinuous, inefficient, equilibria introduced by Bir-
ulin [12]. These equilibria feature overbidding and underbidding. Intuitively, we
show that underbidding (overbidding) cannot be a best response against over-
bidding (underbidding), if one bidder bids according to the efficient equilibrium
with a small probability.
6 Appendix
Lemma 6.1 Let f and g be two continuous functions on an interval [a, b]. For
every k ∈ IN, define
fk(x) = (1− εk)f(x) + εkg(x)
in which εk → 0 as k → ∞. Let yk be a maximizer of fk for every k. Suppose
that function f has a unique maximizer x = y, then yk → y when k →∞.
Proof. We have fk converges to f uniformly. For every k, yk is any maximizer
of fk, which exists since [a, b] is compact. Consider any convergent subsequence
{yk`}∞k`=1 of the sequence {yk}∞k=1. Assume yk` converges to y′ ∈ [a, b] when
k` →∞. Then we have fk`(yk`) ≥ fk`(x) for every x ∈ [a, b]. Now, by uniform
convergence, we have fk`(yk`) −→ f(y′) and fkl(x) −→ f(x), when k` → ∞.
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Therefore, we have f(y′) ≥ f(x) for every x ∈ [a, b]. Then, by uniqueness of
maximizer we have y′ = y. Thus, any convergent subsequence has the same
limit y. Hence, we conclude that {yk}∞k=1 is convergent and converges to y when
k →∞.
Existence proof of weak distributional perfect BNE
To prove that the set of weak distributional perfect BNEs are non-empty, we first
show the following lemmas.
Lemma 6.2 Consider a Bayesian game Γ. Let β = (β1, . . . , βn) be a behav-
ioral strategy profile and γ = (γ1, . . . , γn) be the induced distributional strategy
profile. If γi ∈ BRi(γ), then βi(ti, ·) ∈ BRi(ti, β) for µi-a.e. ti ∈ Ti.
Proof. Suppose for every player i that γi ∈ BRi(γ). Then, we have
Πi(γi, γ−i) ≥ Πi(γ˜i, γ−i),
for every player i’s distributional strategy γ˜i. Therefore, for every player i’s
behavioral strategy β˜i we have∫
Ti
Πbi(βi, β−i | ti) µi(dti) ≥
∫
Ti
Πbi(β˜i, β−i | ti) µi(dti). (1)
Theorem 9.1 in [34] 18 implies that for every player i there is a behavioral strategy
ζi such that ζi(ti, ·) ∈ BRi(ti, β) for every ti ∈ Ti, which means having type
ti ∈ Ti
Πbi(ζi, β−i | ti) ≥ Πbi(ai, β−i | ti),
for every ai ∈ Ai. To prove that βi(ti, ·) for µi-a.e. ti ∈ Ti is a best response for
every player i against β−i, we show that Πbi(ζi, β−i | ti) = Πbi(βi, β−i | ti) for
µi-a.e. ti ∈ Ti. Suppose the opposite. First, let
Si =
{
ti ∈ Ti | Πbi(ζi, β−i | ti) < Πbi(βi, β−i | ti)
}
.
18Suppose (T,M) is a measurable space, X is a topological space with the Borel σ-algebra
B, and F is a correspondence from T to X . Denote GrF = {(t, x) : x ∈ F (t)}. Suppose
u : GrF → IR isM⊗B measurable and u(t, ·) is upper semicontinuous on F (t) for t ∈ T , and
let ν(t) = sup{u(x, t) : x ∈ F (t)} for t ∈ T . Theorem 9.1 in [34] states that if F is compact-
valued and measurable, X is separable metric, and u is the limit of a decreasing sequence of
Caratheodory maps, then ν is measurable and there exits f : T → X measurable such that
u(·, f(·)) = ν.
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Clearly, Si is µi-measurable. Suppose µi(Si) > 0. Notice that given ti ∈ Ti, for
βi(ti, ·)-a.e. ai ∈ Ai we have
Πbi(βi, β−i | ti) = Πbi(ai, β−i | ti).
Then, given ti ∈ Si, for βi(ti, ·)-a.e. ai ∈ Ai we conclude that
Πbi(ζi, β−i | ti) < Πbi(ai, β−i | ti),
which is a contradiction with optimality of ζi for every type. Second, let
Si =
{
ti ∈ Ti | Πbi(ζi, β−i | ti) > Πbi(βi, β−i | ti)
}
and suppose µi(Si) > 0. Therefore, we have∫
Si
Πbi(ζi, β−i | ti) µi(dti) >
∫
Si
Πbi(βi, β−i | ti) µi(dti).
Since ζi(ti, ·) is a best response for every type ti ∈ Ti against β−i, for every
ai ∈ Ai we have
Πbi(ζi, β−i | ti) ≥ Πbi(ai, β−i | ti),
thus ∫
Ti\Si
Πbi(ζi, β−i | ti) µi(dti) ≥
∫
Ti\Si
Πbi(βi, β−i | ti) µi(dti).
Consequently,∫
Ti
Πbi(ζi, β−i | ti) µi(dti) >
∫
Ti
Πbi(βi, β−i | ti) µi(dti).
This is a contradiction with (1). Overall, we showed that if there is a subset of Ti
on which the expected payoff of player i, playing according to ζi is different from
playing according to βi, the measure of that subset is zero. In other words, for
every i there exists a set Si ∈ Ti with µi(Si) = 0 such that for every ti ∈ Ti\Si
we have βi(ti, ·) ∈ BRi(ti, β). This completes the proof.
Lemma 6.3 Consider a Bayesian game Γ. For every player i and every ε > 0,
there is a set E ∈ T such that µ(Ec) < ε and the family {pii(t, ·) | t ∈ E} is
equicontinuous. 19
19A family F of real functions on the metric space X is equicontinuous if to every ε > 0
corresponds a δ > 0 such that for every x, y ∈ X with d(x, y) < ε we have |f(x)− f(y)| < δ,
for every f ∈ F.
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Proof. Let C(A) be the set of all continuous real functions on A. For every
player i consider the mapping t → pii(t, ·) which is a measurable mapping from
T to C(A). Therefore, the probability measure µ on T induces a probability
measure on C(A), say η. Since A is compact metric space, then C(A) is a
compact separable metric space that implies that η is tight. That means, for
every ε > 0 there is a compact set G ⊂ C(A) with η(Gc) < ε. Let E be the
inverse image ofG under the above mapping. Then we have µ(Ec) < ε. SinceG
is compact, by Ascoli-Arzela theorem one concludes that G is equicontinuous.
This completes the proof.
In the following lemma, we use the following metrics: For every t, s ∈ T and
a, b ∈ A, define
dT (t, s) =
(
n∑
i=1
d2Ti(ti, si)
) 1
2
, dA(a, b) =
(
n∑
i=1
d2Ai(ai, bi)
) 1
2
.
Moreover, let dT×A ((t, a), (s, b)) =
(
d2T (t, s) + d
2
A(a, b)
) 1
2 .
Lemma 6.4 Consider a Bayesian game Γ. For every player i and every ε > 0,
there is a set K ∈ T with µ(Kc) < ε such that pii is continuous on K × A for
every i.
Proof. Take ε > 0 and a ∈ A. First we prove that there is a set K ∈ T with
µ(Kc) < ε such that the function pii(·, a) : K → IR is continuous. As A is
separable, it has a countable dense subset, say B. Hence, there exists a sequence
(ak)
∞
k=1 in B such that ak 6= a, for every k, and dA(ak, a) → 0 as k → ∞.
According to Lusin’s Theorem for the collection of the functions {pii(·, ak) |
k = 1, 2, . . .} there is a compact set E ∈ T with µ(Ec) < ε
2
such that pii(·, ak)
is continuous on E for every k ∈ IN. Moreover, by the lemma 6.3 we know that
payoffs are equicontinuous, i.e. there is a set F ∈ T with µ(F c) < ε
2
such that
the collection of the functions {pii(t, ·) : A→ IR | t ∈ F} is equicontinuous. Let
K = E ∩ F . It is clear that µ(Kc) < ε. Moreover, because pii(t, ·) is continuous
in actions for every t ∈ K, the sequence of the functions (pii(·, ak))∞k=1 converges
pointwise to pii(·, a) as k →∞. It is easy to check that equicontinuity of payoffs
and the fact that dA(ak, a)→ 0 as k →∞, implies that the sequence of functions
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(pii(·, ak))∞k=1 uniformly converges to pii(·, a) on K as k → ∞. Hence, pii(·, a) :
K → IR is continuous too.
Now, we prove that pii is continuous at (t, a) ∈ K × A. We know that {pii(t, ·) |
t ∈ K} is equicontinuous, then there is a δ1 > 0 such that if dA(a, b) < δ1,
we have |pii(t, a) − pii(t, b)| < ε2 for every t ∈ K. Also, we know pii(·, a)
is continuous at t ∈ K, so there is a δ2 > 0 such that if dT (t, s) < δ2, we
have |pii(t, a) − pii(s, a)| < ε2 . Let δ = min{δ1, δ2}. Then, for every (s, b) ∈
K × A with dT×A((t, a), (s, b)) < δ we have dA(a, b) < δ1 and dT (s, t) < δ2.
Consequently, we have
|pii(t, a)−pii(s, b)| < |pii(t, a)−pii(s, a)|+ |pii(s, a)−pii(s, b)| < ε
2
+
ε
2
= ε.
This proves that pii is continuous on K × A.
Lemma 6.4 gives a slightly more general result than Lusin’s theorem. Indeed,
Lusin’s theorem would guarantee the existence of a subset of T × A such that
pii is continuous on that subset, while Lemma 6.4 would do that for a set of the
form K × A, where K ⊆ T .
The following lemma is the basic continuity result in Milgrom and Weber [28].
Here we provide a detailed proof of that.
Lemma 6.5 Consider a Bayesian game Γ. For every player i, the function Πi :
∆→ IR is continuous with respect to the weak metric on ∆.
Proof. To prove that Πi is continuous at a distributional strategy profile γ, let
(γk)∞k=1 be a sequence of distributional strategy profiles converging to γ with
respect to the weak metric as k → ∞. Now, by Lemma 6.4, for every i and
every δ > 0, there exist a continuous and bounded function vδ : T ×A→ IR and
a set K ∈ T such that µ(Kc) < δ, and vδ = pii on K × A.
As µ(Kc) < δ, we have γk(Kc×A) < δ, for every k. Similarly, γ(Kc×A) < δ.
Moreover, because vδ and pii are bounded, there is anM > 0 such that |pii−vδ| ≤
M . Hence, for every k we have∫
T×A
|pii − vδ|f(t) dγk =
∫
Kc×A
|pii − vδ|f(t) dγk ≤M · δ.
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Similarly,∫
T×A
|pii − vδ|f(t) dγ =
∫
Kc×A
|pii − vδ|f(t) dγ ≤M · δ.
Furthermore, as f is µˆ-integrable, there is a sequence (f`)∞`=1 of bounded and
continuous functions such that
∫
T
|f(t)− f`(t)|µˆ(dt)→ 0, as `→∞. We have
|Πi(γk)− Πi(γ)| = |
∫
piif(t)dγ
k −
∫
piif(t)dγ|
≤
∫
|pii − vδ|f(t)dγk +
∫
|f(t)− f`(t)|vδdγk
+ |
∫
vδf`(t)dγ
k −
∫
vδf`(t)dγ|
+
∫
|f(t)− f`(t)|vδdγ +
∫
|pii − vδ|f(t)dγ
≤ 2Mδ +
∫
|f(t)− f`(t)|vδdγk
+ |
∫
vδf`dγ
k −
∫
vδf`dγ|+
∫
|f(t)− f`(t)|vδdγ.
Hence, |Πi(γk) − Πi(γ)| converges to zero when k → ∞, ` → ∞, and δ → 0.
This proves that Πi is continuous at γ.
We prove the existence of a weak distributional perfect BNE, with the help of
the following fixed point theorem from Glicksberg [16].
Theorem 6.6 Let S be a nonempty compact and convex subset of a locally con-
vex Hausdorff space. Let F : S  S be an upper hemicontinuous correspon-
dence with nonempty and convex values. Then, F has a fixed point.
Theorem 6.7 The set of distributional perfect BNEs is nonempty.
First we prove that the set of distributional strategy profiles satisfying the con-
ditions in the definition of distributional perfect equilibrium is not empty. For
every player i, let νi be a completely mixed distributional strategy. Note that
such a νi exists, because Ti × Ai is separable. Define for every k ∈ IN
∆i(k) = {γi ∈ ∆i | γi(Bi) ≥ 1
k
· νi(Bi), ∀Bi ∈ Ti ⊗Ai}.
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Moreover, let ∆(k) = ×ni=1∆i(k) andBRki : ∆(k) ∆i(k) be the best response
correspondence for player i restricted to ∆i(k)20 and define the correspondence
BRk : ∆(k) ∆(k) to be
BRk(γ) = ×ni=1BRki (γ),
for every γ ∈ ∆(k). We verify the conditions of Theorem 6.6 for the correspon-
dence BRk.
Since T is a complete and separable metric space, by Theorem 1.4 in [11] µ is
a tight measure.21 This fact together with the compactness of the set A implies
that ∆i is a tight set of probability measures.22 Now, by Prohorov’s Theorem
we conclude that ∆i is a compact metric space with respect to the weak metric.
It is easy to see that ∆i(k) is a closed subset of ∆i with respect to the strong
metric. Consequently, by Theorem V.3.13 in [15], it is closed with respect to the
weak metric. Hence, ∆i(k) is compact with respect to the weak metric. Also,
one can easily check that ∆i(k) is convex. Moreover, upper hemicontinuity of
BRk follows by Lemma 6.5. Now, we apply Theorem 6.6, which leads us to the
existence of an equilibrium point γk ∈ ∆(k), for every k.
Now, define23
PBRi(γ) = {(ti, ai) ∈ Ti × Ai | (ti, ai) ∈ supp(γi) and γi ∈ BRi(γ)} .
It is clear that γki
(
PBRi(γ
k)
) ≥ 1 − 1
k
νi(Ti × Ai) = 1 − 1k . This implies that
ρw(γki , BRi(γ
k)) ≤ 1
k
. Furthermore, as ∆i is compact with respect to the weak
metric, without loss of generality we can assume that there is a distributional
strategy profile γ such that ρw(γk, γ) → 0 when k → ∞. Let β be a behavioral
strategy profile corresponding to γ. Obviously, β is a distributionally perfect.
20Distributional strategy γi of player i is a best response restricted to ∆i(k) against a distri-
butional strategy profile η−i ∈ ∆−i(k), if Πi(γi, η−i) ≥ Πi(γ˜i, η−i), for every distributional
strategy γ˜i ∈ ∆i(k) of player i.
21Let X be a metric space with the Borel σ-field Σ. A measure µ on Σ is tight if for every
G ∈ Σ, µ(G) = sup{µ(K) | K ⊂ G, and K compact}. Moreover, Theorem 1.4 in [11] states
that if X is separable and complete, then each probability measure on Σ is tight.
22A family of probability measures on a metric space is tight if for every ε > 0 there is a
compact set K satisfying µ(K) > 1− ε, for every µ in the family.
23Recall that supp(µ) = {x ∈ X | for every open set G if x ∈ G then µ(G) > 0} .
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We show that there is a BNE βˆ such that for µi-a.e. ti ∈ Ti we have βi(ti, ·) =
βˆi(ti, ·), for every player i. Then, since β is distributionally perfect, trivially the
BNE βˆ is also distributionally perfect. Hence, the set of distributional perfect
BNEs is nonempty, as desired.
Since β = (β1, . . . , βn) is distributionally perfect, by definition we know that
for the induced distributional strategy profile γ = (γ1, . . . , γn) there exists a
sequence (γk)∞k=1 = (γ
k
1 , . . . , γ
k
n)
∞
k=1 of completely mixed distributional strategy
profiles such that for every player i we have lim
k→∞
ρw(γki , γi) = 0 and
lim
k→∞
ρw(γki , BRi(γ
k)) = 0.
Therefore, for every i, there exists a sequence (γˆki )
∞
k=1 such that γˆ
k
i ∈ BRi(γk)
for every k ∈ IN and ρw(γki , γˆki ) → 0 as k → ∞. By the triangle inequality for
ρw this implies for every i that ρw(γi, γˆki ) → 0 as k → ∞. Now, by Lemma
6.5 we conclude the upper hemicontinuity of the correspondence BRi, for every
player i. Hence, γi ∈ BRi(γ).
Now, by Lemma 6.2 we have βi(ti, ·) ∈ BRi(ti, β) for µi-a.e. ti ∈ Ti. In other
words, for every i there exists a set Si ∈ Ti with µi(Si) = 0 such that for every
ti ∈ Ti\Si we have βi(ti, ·) ∈ BRi(ti, β). Define βˆ = (βˆ1, . . . , βˆn) by letting
βˆi(ti, ·) = βi(ti, ·) for every ti ∈ Ti\Si and selecting any βˆi(ti, ·) ∈ BRi(ti, β)
for every ti ∈ Si. Note that the result of this selection is measurable. Clearly, βˆ
is a BNE and satisfies the requirement of the definition.
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